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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
AND DESCRIBING THE NATURE OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah, U.C.A,, 
§78-2-2 (1953, as amended); Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court; and Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure. 
Provo City Corporation (Provo City) and Christensen & 
Griffith Construction Company (Christensen) sued the State of 
Utah, by and through its Department of Transportation (the 
State), and Staker Paving & Construction Company (Staker) for 
alleged damages arising out of the State's diking project along 
Interstate 15 in 1984. The State and Staker filed motions for 
summary judgment. The State's motion was granted, and Stakerfs 
motion was denied. The trial court certified the order granting 
the State's motion for summary judgment as final pursuant to 
Rule 54(b). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the lower court correct in granting the 
State's motion for summary judgment as to Christensen's com-
plaint based on the doctrine of governmental immunity as pro-
vided in U.C.A. §63-30-3? 
2. Was the lower court correct in granting the 
State's motion for summary judgment as to Staker's cross-claim 
for contribution and indemnity? 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated §63-30-3—Immunity of Governmental 
Entities From Suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, 
or other governmental health care facility, 
and from an approved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical 
training program conducted in either public 
or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, re-
pair, and operation of flood and storm sys-
tems by governmental entities are considered 
to be governmental functions, and governmen-
tal entities and their officers and employees 
are immune from suit for any injury or damage 
resulting from those activities. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
Provo City and Christensen filed suit against the 
State and Staker seeking to recover damages resulting from de-
fendants' alleged failure to remove coffer dams which had been 
installed in connection with the State's diking project during 
1984 along 1-15 just south of Provo. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
The State and Staker filed separate motions for sum-
mary judgment. Staker's motion was denied, and the State's 
motion was granted as to plaintiffs' claims and Staker's cross-
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claim for contribution and indemnity. The order granting the 
State1s motion for summary judgment was certified as final pur-
suant to Rule 54(b). Provo City, Christensen, and Staker all 
perfected timely appeals. Since its appeal was filed, Provo 
City has settled with Staker and the State. Provo City's appeal 
has been dismissed, and it is no longer a party to this appeal. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW: 
The trial court granted the State's motion for summary 
judgment and certified the order granting that motion as final 
pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
1. In 1983 and 1984, Utah experienced some of the 
worst flooding of its history. In 1983, the level of Utah Lake 
increased substantially beyond its historic high point. Utah 
Lake was expected to reach in 1984 the same high level reached 
in 1983 (Earl Kemp depo. p. 45). 
2. In 1983 and 1984, rising waters of Utah Lake 
threatened Interstate 15 just south of Provo. In response to 
the threat of flooding and in order to prevent it, the State 
formulated a project called the Utah Lake Dike Project (the dike 
project). The dike project consisted of placing a dike on ei-
ther side of 1-15 from just south of the Ironton Connection to 
north of the University Avenue overpass. Staker was the suc-
cessful bidder on the project and was awarded the contract to 
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construct the dikes on either side of 1-15. Staker subcon-
tracted some of the work to third-party defendants Gallegos 
Construction Company and Hikiau Construction Company, neither of 
which is a party to this appeal (R., p. 484, John D. Keyes 
depo., pp. 4, 5, 54, and 55 (hereafter Keyes depo.); R., pp. 
292-331; Wilson depo., pp. 3-5). 
3. Several waterways located in the area of the dike 
project carry water from the mountains on the east of 1-15 to 
Utah Lake on the west. Since 1-15 runs north and south between 
the mountains and Utah Lake, it acts as a dam keeping water from 
following its natural drainage course. When 1-15 was con-
structed, several water-carrying conduits were created under I-
15 to allow the water to follow its natural drainage course from 
the mountains on the east to Utah Lake on the west. Part of the 
dike project consisted of extending some of those conduits 
through the dikes, which were placed on either side of 1-15, so 
that the water could continue to flow through the conduits to 
Utah Lake. The conduits which were extended as part of the dike 
project were two 10f x 5f concrete box culverts and two corru-
gated metal pipes, one 36" and the other 60" in diameter (Keyes 
depo., pp. 6, 8, and 10; Kemp depo., pp. 20-26 and 108-110). 
4. The process of extending the culverts and pipes 
involved building an earthen wall, referred to as a coffer dam, 
around each end of the culvert or pipe. The water trapped be-
tween the two coffer dams was then pumped out to create a dry 
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area for making the extensions on either end of the conduit. 
With the coffer dams in place, the flow of water from east to 
west through that conduit was temporarily impeded. Once the 
extensions of the culvert or pipe were completed, the coffer 
dams were then removed to allow the water once again to flow 
through the extended conduit to Utah Lake (Keyes depo., pp. 11, 
12, and 25). 
5. At approximately the same time that the dike 
project was taking place, Provo City was engaged in a project to 
expand its municipal golf course (the golf course project) lo-
cated just east of 1-15 in the area of the dike project. The 
plans for the golf course project were completed in November 
1983. Provo City solicited competitive bids on the golf course 
project which were opened on February 17, 1984. The successful 
bidder was plaintiff Christensen & Griffith Construction Compa-
ny, who was awarded the contract by Provo City (Kemp depo., pp. 
32, 33, 130 and 131; Exhibit "5" to Kemp depo., p.7; R., p. 483; 
Gary Melvin Griffith depo., pp. 6 and 17 (hereafter Gary 
Griffith depo. )) . 
6. Those who prepared the plans for the golf course 
project knew that 1983 had been a very wet year and that the 
level of Utah Lake had increased substantially beyond its his-
toric high point. They were aware of the State's dike project 
to keep 1—15 from being flooded. They estimated that in 1984, 
Utah Lake would reach a level of 4,495f, the same high water 
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mark reached in 1983 - The plans on the golf course project 
contained information indicating that the level of Utah Lake was 
expected to rise during the summer of 1984 to 4,495f. Those 
plans were made available to all bidders on the golf course 
project, including Christensen. Information regarding the ex-
pected high water level of Utah Lake was included in the plans 
so that bidders on the project would know what kind of condi-
tions they could expect to encounter and so that they would be 
able to make a fair bid which would take all conditions into 
account (Kemp depo., pp. 32, 34, 35, 39-41, 44-46, and 142; 
Exhibit "1" to Kemp depo., pp. 2 and 7; Gary Griffith depo., p. 
6). 
7. Prior to the bid openings on the golf course 
project, the engineers on the project made the contractors aware 
that Utah Lake was expected to reach a level of 4,495f in 1984, 
that the peak would occur about Memorial Day, and that the lake 
would stay at that high level for about two and one-half weeks 
(Kemp depo., pp. 47, 48, 51, 52, and 67). 
8. Prior to bidding on the golf course project, 
Christensen had been told that the water of Utah Lake would rise 
to a high point of about 4,495* and that the high point would 
last until early to mid-June. Christensen expected the water to 
rise to that high level and assumed that there would be natural-
ly-produced flood conditions until sometime in June. 
Christensen took the high water situation into account in making 
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its bid on the golf course project (Gary Griffith depo., pp. 8, 
9, 40, 41 and 45) . 
9. On March 29, 1984, the amendment to Utah Code 
Anno. §63-30-3, part of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
became effective. That amendment added the following paragraph 
to §63-30-3: 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters in the construction, re-
pair, and operation of flood and storm sys-
tems by governmental entities are considered 
to be governmental functions, and govern-
mental entities and their officers and em-
ployees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
10. Work on the dike project began in March 1984. 
The first time that the flow of water from east to west through 
any of the conduits was impeded by coffer dams was March 19, 
1984, when coffer dams were placed around the ends of one of the 
concrete box culverts. No other conduit was blocked off until 
March 30, 1984, when the 60" corrugated pipe was blocked off 
(Keyes depo., pp. 12, 13, 29-31, 35, and 37). 
11. Even with the coffer dams in place, as of April 
1984, the water level on the east side of 1-15 was only 1/10f 
higher than the water level on the west side. The water level 
on the east side remained within 1 /10f of the level on the west 
side until the first part of May 1984. Even before the dike 
project, the water level on the east side of 1-15 had normally 
and historically been 1 /10f higher than the level on the west 
side. The water level on the east side did not reach the level 
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of 4,495f until mid-May 1984 (Kemp depo., pp. 91, 92, 110, 160-
161; Exhibits tf3ff and "20" to Kemp depo; R., p. 485, Walter C. 
Rowley depo., pp. 16-17 (hereafter Rowley depo.)). 
12. Christensen began construction on the golf course 
project in March 1984, sometime after March 12. Christensen 
experienced no unusual problems with the golf course construc-
tion until the middle of the summer, approximately June or July 
1984. About that time, Christensen began experiencing what it 
considered to be an artificially high water level which impeded 
its work. The excessively high water level continued until 
approximately mid-September 1984, when coffer dams were alleged-
ly found to be still in place on the west side of 1-15 and were 
subsequently removed. Even after the artificially high water 
level on the east side had lowered, the east side water level 
was only 1 /10f higher than the west side water level (R., p. 
482, David Gary Griffith depo., pp. 5, 16-19, and 28-32; Gary 
Griffith depo., pp. 18-20; Kemp depo., pp. 110; Exhibit "2" to 
Kemp depo.) . 
13. Christensen's complaint seeks damages stemming 
from the artificially high water level on the east side of 1-15 
during the summer of 1984. Christensen claims that the State 
negligently failed to remove the coffer dams and that the fail-
ure to remove the coffer dams resulted in the artificially high 
water level on the east side of 1-15. Christensen alleges that 
the artificially high water level impeded the golf course proj-
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ect, necessitating extensive diking, road building, and re-doing 
of work which otherwise would not have been required (R., p. 2, 
1[s 5 and 7, p. 245, 1(6, and pp. 214-217; Kemp depo., pp. 96-
101). 
14. Staker filed nothing in opposition to the State's 
motion for summary judgment as to Staker's cross-claim for con-
tribution and indemnity. The lower court decided the State's 
motion for summary judgment without oral argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The 1984 amendment to §63-30-3 constitutes a with-
drawal by the Legislature of its consent to the bringing of 
suits against governmental entities for injury resulting from 
the management of flood waters and other natural disasters. 
That immunity is not subject to the exceptions contained in §63-
30-5 through §63-30-10. 
2. Christensen's arguments concerning the impairment 
of the obligation of contracts, violation of the due process 
clause, and taking of property without just compensation have 
been raised for the first time on appeal and should not be con-
sidered by this Court. 
3. The 1984 amendment does not affect rights and 
liabilities between Provo City and Christensen, and does not, 
therefore, impair the obligation of the contract between Provo 
City and Christensen. 
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4. The State's alleged failure to remove the coffer 
dams resulting in damage to Christensen does not constitute a 
deprivation of property without due process. Such a result 
would be contrary to the intent of the drafters of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Likewise, the State's alleged failure to 
remove the coffer dams does not constitute a taking of property 
without just compensation. 
5. Christensen has failed to raise any genuine issue 
of material fact which would preclude summary judgment in favor 
of the State. 
6. Staker failed to raise any opposition to the 
State's motion for summary judgment as to Staker's cross-claim, 
and Staker's argument in that regard should not be considered. 
Even if Staker's argument is considered, the exception to gov-
ernmental immunity for equitable claims should be limited to 
those situations where a governmental entity is attempting to 
derive some benefit it is not entitled to. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATE IS IMMUNE FROM CHRISTENSEN1S 
SUIT PURSUANT TO U.C.A. §63-30-3 
In 1984, the Utah Legislature amended §63-30-3 of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Act) to add a provision 
relating to the management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters. The lower court interpreted that provision as pro-
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viding immunity to the State from plaintiffs1 suit and granted 
the Statefs motion for summary judgment based on §63-30-3, as 
amended • Christensen argues that the lower court's interpreta-
tion of that provision was incorrect and that immunity has been 
waived pursuant to §63-30-8, §63-30-9, and §63-30-10, A careful 
examination of the 1984 amendment to §63-30-3 will reveal the 
fallacy of Christensen1s argument and the correctness of the 
lower court's determination that §63-30-3 grants the State im-
munity from Christensen1s suit. 
Prior to 1966, the doctrine of sovereign or governmen-
tal immunity was a well-settled principle of Utah common law. 
In 1966, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, U.C.A. §63-30-1, jet_. seq. , which codified and 
reaffirmed governmental immunity "for any injury which results 
from the exercise of a governmental function." U.C.A. §63-30-
1. See, generally, Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 
1983). 
The statutory structure established by the Legislature 
in the Act is such that immunity from suit is preserved for any 
injury resulting from the exercise of a governmental function, 
except where the Legislature has explicitly waived immunity. 
The applicable language of the Act is as follows: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function.... 
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The "except as may be otherwise provided" language refers to the 
specific waivers of immunity contained in §63-30-5 through §63-
30-10. 
These waivers of immunity allowing suit against the 
State are purely statutory and exist only because the Legis-
lature has given its consent to the bringing of suits as pro-
vided in the waivers. The Legislature may, however, at any time 
it thinks proper, withdraw that consent or change the conditions 
and requirements of the consent. See, e.g., Sikes v. Candler 
County, 274 S.E.2d 464, 466 (Ga. 1981). ("A statutory waiver of 
sovereign immunity, as a matter of grace could be granted, with-
drawn, or restricted at the will of the Legislature."); Brown v. 
Wichita State Univ., 547 P.2d 1015 (Kan. 1976) (held that even 
where the court has abrogated judicially-imposed governmental 
immunity, the Legislature has constitutional authority to re-
impose it); and Morris v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 
215 S.E.2d 430, 433 (S.C. 1975) ("We keep in mind the fact that 
inasmuch as the right to sue is purely statutory, the Legis-
lature has the power not only to restrict such right but to 
withhold it, or withdraw it altogether".) See, generally, 72 
Am.Jur.2d States, §125. 
The plain language of the 1984 amendment to §63-30-3 
indicates that the Legislature intended to withdraw its consent 
to the bringing of suits for injuries resulting from the manage-
ment of flood waters and other natural disasters. The amendment 
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plainly states that "governmental entities and their officers 
and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage 
resulting from [flood management] activities." 
Christensen argues that the amendment was intended 
only to include flood management activities within the category 
of "governmental function." Christensen, however, focuses only 
on the first part of the amendment and ignores the second part. 
The first part of the amendment provides that "[t]he managment 
of flood waters and other natural disasters and the constructio, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental function...". Had 
the amendment stopped there, Christensen's argument may have 
some merit. The amendment continued, however, with language 
clearly indicating a Legislative intent to withdraw consent for 
suit arising from flood management activities. The full amend-
ment is set forth below, as follows: 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, re-
pair, and operation of flood and storm sys-
tems by governmental entities are considered 
to be governmental functions, and governmen-
tal entities and their officers and employees 
are immune from suit for any injury or damage 
resulting from those activities. 
U.C.A. §63-30-3 (emphasis added). 
The language of the amendment plainly indicates a 
legislative intent to provide immunity from suit to governmental 
entities for injuries resulting from flood management activi-
ties. The rules of statutory construction require the Court to 
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construe statutes "on the assumption that each term is used 
advisedly and that the intent of the Legislature is revealed in 
the use of the term in the context and structure in which it is 
placed," Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984). 
Applying that principle to the language of the 1984 amendment 
leads to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to with-
draw its consent to the bringing of suit for injury or damage 
resulting from flood management activities. 
This conclusion is further reinforced when the 1984 
amendment is considered in the context of the circumstances 
extant at the time of its passage. In 1983 and 1984, Utah was 
experiencing some of the worst flooding of its history. At 
various locations throughout the state, including the one in-
volved in this case, flood waters were threatening to inundate 
portions of the interstate freeway. Swollen waterways and 
saturated ground threatened, and in some circumstances caused, 
substantial damage. Emergency measures were required to mini-
mize the effects of the flooding. The Legislature determined, 
as a public policy matter, that in dealing with the drastic 
circumstances created by the flooding situation, governmental 
entities should be immune from suit so that they could address 
the flooding problems without the restrictions which the fear of 
liability suits might create. While this Court might question 
the wisdom of the Legislature's withdrawal of its consent to the 
bringing of suit for injury resulting from flood management 
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activities, the withdrawal of consent was a proper exercise of 
the Legislative prerogative. This Court should not substitute 
its own judgment for that of the Legislature. 
As mentioned above, Christensen argues that the Legis-
lature's intent in enacting the 1984 amendment was simply to 
include flood management activities as a governmental function 
subject to the waivers contained in the Act. Not only does that 
argument ignore the second portion of the amendment affirmative-
ly providing for immunity from suit for flood management activi-
ties, but it also renders the amendment superfluous and meaning-
less. In enacting the 1984 amendment, the Legislature is pre-
sumed to be aware of court decisions interpreting the term "gov-
ernmental function" found in §63-30-3. See, e.g., State v. 
Theilken, 684 P.2d 709 (Wash. 1984). (In construing legisla-
tion, the court presumes the legislature is familiar with past 
judicial interpretations of its enactments.) This Court has 
construed the term "governmental function" to mean an activity 
"of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of gov-
ernmental activity." Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 
P.2d 1230, 1236, 1237 (Utah 1980). The Court later explained 
that this test "does not refer to what government may do, but to 
what government alone must do." Johnson v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981). (Emphasis in original). 
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There can be few clearer examples of a governmental 
function, as construed above, than the management of flood 
waters. The Legislature was aware, prior to the 1984 amendment, 
that the management of flood waters constituted a governmental 
function as that term was construed by the Court. Enactment of 
the 1984 amendment merely to declare the management of flood 
waters and other natural disasters as a governmental function 
would have been superfluous and meaningless. This Court should 
not presume that the Legislature enacted a meaningless statute. 
See, e.g., City of Olathe v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 696 P.2d 
409, 413 (Kan. App. 1985). ("There is a presumption that the 
Legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless 
legislation.") 
Under Point II of its brief, Christensen suggests that 
the acts complained of in this action do not really constitute 
flood management activities. Apart from the sheer absurdity of 
that suggestion when considering the circumstances existing in 
1983 and 1984, there is absolutely no evidence in the record to 
support it. To the contrary, there is significant uncontro-
verted evidence in the record clearly establishing that the 
implementation of the dike project constitutes flood management 
activities. See, R., pp. 292-331. 
Christensen also suggests that immunity should apply 
only for damages resulting from "natural floods", and not for 
damages resulting from "man-made floods" (Appellant's Brief, p. 
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20). This argument likewise has no logic. If damages are 
caused by a natural flood without any intervention by the State, 
the State would have no possible liability and would have no 
need of immunity. On the other hand, under Christensen's argu-
ment the State would have no immunity from suit for damages 
resulting from "man-made floods", which are the only ones where 
the State might have liability and, therefore, the need for 
immunity. Christensen's argument simply makes no sense. 
Finally, under Point I of its brief, Christensen cites 
several cases in support of its proposition that immunity from 
suit for injury resulting from flood management activities is 
subject to the waivers of immunity contained in the Act. None 
of those cases, however, deals with either the management of 
flood waters and other natural disasters or with the 1984 amend-
ment to §63-30-3- Those cases, therefore, have no bearing on 
this case. 
POINT II. 
CHRISTENSENfS ARGUMENT REGARDING THE 
ALLEGED IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION 
OF CONTRACT WAS NOT RAISED IN THE 
LOWER COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
BY THIS COURT. THAT ARGUMENT IS, IN 
ANY EVENT, WITHOUT MERIT. 
Under Point III of its brief, Christensen argues that 
the 1984 amendment constitutes a law impairing the obligation of 
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its contract with Provo City in violation of Article I, §18 of 
the Constitution of Utah. This argument was never raised at any 
stage in the proceedings below and should not now be considered 
by this Court on appeal. 
It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the 
trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Devel. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 
(Utah 1983)• The burden is on the parties to make certain that 
the record they compile will adequately preserve their arguments 
for review in the event of an appeal. JEcL at p. 1045. There is 
no hint anywhere in the record that this issue was even suggest-
ed to the trial court. Accordingly, under established rules 
enunciated by this Court, this issue should not be considered. 
Even if this issue is considered, Christensen1s argu-
ment is without merit. The 1984 amendment does not affect the 
rights and liabilities between the contracting parties, Provo 
City and Christensen. Christensenfs only rights affected, if 
any, are its rights to recover in tort against an entity which 
is not a party to the contract. The 1984 amendment granting the 
State immunity for injury resulting from the management of flood 
waters cannot be any stretch of the imagination be deemed to 
impair the obligation of the contract between Provo City and 
Christensen. Even if the Court reaches this issue, therefore, 
the Court should reject Christensen's argument. 
_1 A_ 
POINT III. 
CHRISTENSENfS ARGUMENT REGARDING "TAKING 
AND "DUE PROCESS" WAS NOT RAISED IN THE 
LOWER COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
BY THIS COURT. THAT ARGUMENT IS, IN ANY 
EVENT, WITHOUT MERIT. 
Under Point IV of its brief, Christensen argues for 
the first time that the 1984 amendment "poses constitutional 
problems under the taking and due process clauses." As with 
Christensen1s argument regarding the impairment of the obliga-
tion of contracts, this argument is raised for the first time on 
appeal. It was not articulated in any form to the trial court. 
As with the impairment of the obligation of contracts argument, 
this argument should likewise not be considered. 
Even if it is considered, it is without merit. 
Christensen argues that the State's failure to remove the coffer 
dams, which allegedly resulted in damage to Christensen, consti-
tutes a deprivation of Christensenfs property without due pro-
cess of law. Christensen cites Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 
(1981) in support of that argument. Parratt was a suit by an 
inmate of a Nebraska prison seeking recovery of the value of 
hobby materials which plaintiff claimed prison officials had 
negligently lost. The Court concluded that plaintiff did not 
allege a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and stated as follows: 
To accept [plaintiff's] argument that the 
conduct of the state officials in this case 
constituted a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would almost necessarily result in 
turning every alleged injury which may have 
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been inflicted by a state official acting 
under "color of law" into a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment cognizable under § 1983 • 
It is hard to perceive any logical stopping 
place to such a line of reasoning. Presum-
ably, under this rationale, any party who is 
involved in nothing more than an automobile 
accident with a state official could allege a 
constitutional violation under §1983.... We 
do not think that the drafters of the Four-
teenth Amendment intended the Amendment to 
play such a role in our society. 
Id. at p. 544. Similarly, Christensen's argument that the 
State's alleged failure to remove the coffer dams constitutes a 
deprivation of property without due process is contrary to the 
intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Additionally, Christensen appears to argue that the 
State's alleged failure to remove the coffer dams constitues a 
taking of property without just compensation. As indicated 
above, the Court should not consider this issue which has been 
raised for the first time on appeal. If, however, the Court 
considers this argument, the State, in an effort to avoid repe-
titious argument and to save the Court's time, responds by in-
corporating herein by reference the arguments set forth in the 
supplemental briefs of respondents in the following cases cur-
rently on appeal before this Court and which were consolidated 
for oral argument before this Court: 
Diane Branam v. Provo School Dist., Case No. 20935; 
and 
Robert D. Irvine v. Salt Lake County, Case No. 21053. 
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A copy of respondent's brief in each of these cases 
has already been provided to counsel for the parties in this 
case in connection with defendant State of Utah's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion by Provo City to Reconsider State of Utah's 
Summary Judgment Motion in the lower court. 
POINT IV. 
THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT TO BE RESOLVED, AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE STATE WAS APPROPRIATE 
Under Point V of its brief, Christensen argues that 
genuine issues of material fact remain to be resolved precluding 
summary judgment. However, Christensen has failed to raise any 
genuine issues of material fact remaining to be resolved. The 
lower court was correct in granting the State's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
Christensen claims that a fact issue remains as to 
whether the acts of the State caused Christensen's damages. For 
purposes of this appeal, the State does not contest 
Christensen's allegation that the State failed to remove the 
coffer dams and that that failure caused Christensen's damages. 
Christensen also claims a fact issue remains as to 
whether the State's activities consituted "a flood-related gov-
ernmental function" or a "man-made flood". This does not raise 
a fact issue, but merely presents a question of semantics in 
describing the underlying undisputed facts. 
Christensen next raises as a factual issue the ques-
tion of whether the State's activities "were exempted from gov-
ernmental immunity," That, however, is not a factual issue but 
a legal issue. 
Finally, Christensen claims a fact issue remains be-
cause the State disputes that the water on the east side of 1-15 
remained 1' to 1 1/2' higher than the Utah Lake water level 
until mid-September, when Christensen breached the coffer dams. 
First, that factual issue is not material to the determination 
of the issues in this case. Second, the State will concede, for 
purposes of this appeal, that the water on the east side of 1-15 
remained 1' to 1 1/2' higher than the water level on the west 
side of 1-15 until mid-September. See, 1[ 12 under Statement of 
Facts, above. 
Christensen has failed to raise even one genuine issue 
of material fact which would preclude summary judgment in favor 
of the State. The uncontroverted facts establish that 
Christensen could not possibly have incurred any damage prior to 
March 29, 1984, the effective date of the 1984 amendment. The 
interpretation of that amendment is purely a legal question. 
There remains no issue of any material fact to be resolved in 
order to determine, as a matter of law, that the State is enti-
tled to summary judgment. 
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POINT V. 
STAKERfS ARGUMENT, RAISED FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL, SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED. 
IN ANY EVENT, THE EXCEPTION TO 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR EQUITABLE CLAIMS 
SHOULD NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
When the State filed its motion for summary judgment, 
it sought summary judgment not only against the plaintiffs but 
also against Staker as to Staker's cross-claim for contribution 
and indemnity (R. pp. 180, 181, and 193). At no time in the 
lower court proceedings did Staker ever present any argument to 
the lower court in opposition to the State's motion for summary 
judgment. The trial court never had an opportunity to consider 
and rule upon the argument now being presented by Staker for the 
first time on appeal in its appellant's brief. As stated above 
as to Christensen's arguments raised for the first time on ap-
peal, the Court should not consider Staker's argument raised for 
the first time on appeal but should affirm the summary judgment 
in favor of the State. 
Even if the Court considers Staker's argument, the 
Court should affirm the summary judgment in favor of the State. 
In its brief, Staker argues that contribution and indemnity are 
equitable claims and that the common law recognizes an exception 
to governmental immunity for equitable claims. Staker cites two 
cases in support of that proposition. Both cases were suits in 
equity to prevent the State from obtaining a benefit to which it 
was not entitled. 
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In contrast to the two cases cited by Staker, Stakerfs 
cross-claim against the State, while technically stating equit-
able claims, does not attempt to prevent the State from obtain-
ing some benefit to which it is not entitled. Staker's claims 
for contribution and indemnity, if allowed, would permit Staker 
to do in a cross-claim what it could not do in a direct action 
as a plaintiff. Such would be contrary to the intent and pur-
pose of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The equitable claims which create an exception to 
governmental immunity should be limited to those situations 
where a governmental entity is attempting to derive some benefit 
it is not entitled to. In that type of situation, equity would 
demand that the plaintiff be entitled to sue and recover what in 
equity does not belong to the State. The exception should not 
extend to every equitable claim simply because it is technically 
an equitable claim. Where that equitable claim is simply a 
means to allow indirectly what the Governmental Immunity Act 
would not allow directly, the exception should not apply. See, 
Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R. Co M 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant State of Utah 
respectfully requests the Court to affirm the lower court's 
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granting of the State's motion for summary judgment as to 
Christensen's complaint and as to Staker's cross-claim. 
DATED this 17th day of January, 1989. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
^TAfiHANr E. KTPP 
ROBERT H. REES 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Respondent State of Utah 
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